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Abstract—Model-based testing is a promising technology for
black-box software and hardware testing, in which test cases are
generated automatically from high-level specifications. Nowadays,
systems typically consist of multiple interacting components and,
due to their complexity, testing presents a considerable portion of
the effort and cost in the design process. Exploiting the composi-
tional structure of system specifications can considerably reduce
the effort in model-based testing. Moreover, inferring properties
about the system from testing its individual components allows
the designer to reduce the amount of integration testing.
In this paper, we study compositional properties of the ioco-
testing theory. We propose a new approach to composition and
hiding operations, inspired by contract-based design and interface
theories. These operations preserve behaviors that are compatible
under composition and hiding, and prune away incompatible
ones. The resulting specification characterizes the input sequences
for which the unit testing of components is sufficient to infer
the correctness of component integration without the need for
further tests. We provide a methodology that uses these results
to minimize integration testing effort, but also to detect potential
weaknesses in specifications. While we focus on asynchronous
models and the ioco conformance relation, the resulting method-
ology can be applied to a broader class of systems.
Keywords—compositional testing, model-based testing
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern software and hardware system design usually
involves the integration of interacting components that work
together in order to realize some requested behavior. Fig. 1
illustrates two components I1 and I2 that are composed
together to form the system I . The complexity of the individual
components together with their elaborate cooperation protocols
often results in behavioral faults. Therefore, verification and
validation methods are applied to ensure that the embedded
system satisfies its specification. This is in particular true
for safety-critical designs, for which correctness evidence
is imposed by the regulation bodies (see for example the
automotive standard ISO 26262 [1]).
Up to date, design simulation combined with testing re-
mains the preferred technique in industry to demonstrate
the correctness of software and hardware systems. Typically,
verification engineers need to first test individual system
components (unit testing of I1 and I2), and then test the
complete system (integration testing of I). This process relies
on verification engineers manually generating test vectors from
specifications given as informal (natural language) require-
ments. This process is inherently time consuming, ad-hoc and
prone to human errors. As a result, testing represents the main
bottleneck in the design of complex systems today.
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Fig. 1. A system consisting of two interacting components.
Model-based testing is a technology that provides formal-
ization and automation to the test case generation and execu-
tion process, thus reducing time and cost of systems design.
In model-based testing a system-under-test (SUT), denoted by
I , is tested for conformance to its formal specification model
S, derived from informal requirements. While S is a formal
object, I is a “black-box”, a physical implementation with
unknown internal structure. The SUT I can be accessed by
the tester only through its external interface. In order to reason
about the compliance of I to S, one needs to use the testing
assumption (see [2]), stating that I can be modeled in the same
formalism as S and that I is receptive (input-enabled), i.e. it
accepts all inputs at any point in time. In contrast to I , S does
not need to be receptive. Lack of input (under-specification) in
a given state of the specification models the assumption that
the external environment for I does not provide that input.
If the environment nevertheless emits this input action, the
specification allows I to freely choose its response.
In this paper, we focus on the ioco-testing theory [2],
a model-based testing framework for input/output labeled
transition systems (IOLTS). The ioco-testing theory is centered
around the input/output conformance relation ioco. Informally,
we say that an implementation I ioco-conforms to its specifi-
cation S if any experiment derived from S and executed on I
leads to an output in I that is foreseen by S. In the ioco-testing
theory, the lack of outputs or internal transitions is observable
via a quiescence action.
In its original form, ioco-testing does not take the composi-
tional aspects of systems into account. For example, in Fig. 1, I
is the result of composing the components I1 and I2. Typically,
the actions over which the two components synchronize (e and
d in the example) are hidden and become unobservable to the
tester after integration. In order to cope with costly testing
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of large systems, results of unit testing individual components
need to be used to infer properties about the composed system,
to avoid or at least minimize expensive integration tests.
The compositional ioco-testing problem can be formulated
as follows: if I1 ioco-conforms to its specification model S1
and I2 ioco-conforms to its specification model S2, can we
infer that I also ioco-conforms to S, where I and S denote
the composed implementation and specification after hiding
synchronization actions?
This question was first addressed in [3]. The authors
show that in the general case neither parallel composition
of specifications nor hiding of actions are compositional in
the ioco-testing theory. This result is not surprising. Parallel
composition is an operation tailored to receptive models. We
argue that it is not an appropriate operator for composing
under-specified models where one component can generate
an output which is not expected as an input by the other. In
addition, the hiding operation introduces partial observation
over the actual state of the SUT and can result in confusion
regarding the under-specified parts of the system. The authors
of [3] propose two alternative restrictions to the specification
models in order to preserve compositionality of ioco. The
first option is to disallow under-specification of inputs. This
is a very strong requirement in practice, since components
are usually designed to operate in constrained environments.
The second option allows starting with under-specification, but
requires demonic completion of specification models — an
operation which makes the assumptions about the component’s
environment explicit and thus makes the specification model
input-enabled. We claim that demonic completion can hide
important information from the tester about the poor quality
of a specification and thus obscure its original intent.
We propose a different approach to compositional ioco-
testing which, in contrast to [3], does not restrict the specifica-
tion models. We define two operations — friendly composition
and hiding — that are tailored to the integration of non-
receptive specifications. They are based on a game-theoretic
optimistic approach, inspired by interface theories [4], [5].
The result of the friendly composition is the overall spec-
ification that integrates the component specifications while
pruning away any inputs that lead to incompatible interactions
between the components. The friendly hiding operation prunes
away inputs that lead to states which are ambiguous with
respect to under-specification after hiding. After composing the
component specifications followed by hiding of synchronizing
actions, the resulting specification defines all input sequences
for which no integration testing is needed — the correct
integration follows from the conformance of the individual
components to their specification. In addition to these technical
results, this paper provides guidelines to identify specifications
that are poorly modeled for compositional testing. We argue
that pruned input sequences often indicate weaknesses in the
specification and can be addressed by: (1) strengthening the
specifications; (2) making more outputs observable; and (3)
integration testing. Indeed, the proper formalization of require-
ments resulting in high-quality component specifications is
crucial for exploiting the compositional nature of systems in
testing. Investing efforts in improving models can considerably
minimize expensive integration tests. We discuss methodologi-
cal aspects of using our technical results to improve component
models and to tailor them to compositional testing.
In Section II, we further motivate the problem of compo-
sitional testing with ioco and provide an informal overview of
our approach, illustrating it with a vending machine example.
We also identify modeling issues and discuss problems related
to compositional ioco-testing and sketch possible solutions.
Section III recalls the basics of the ioco-testing theory includ-
ing the known results about compositional ioco-testing. We
provide the formal presentation of our approach in Section IV
and evaluate it in Section V. We present related work in
more detail in Section VI, and finally conclude the paper
in Section VII, giving future perspectives for our work. The
proofs are presented in a separate report [6].
II. OVERVIEW AND MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
In this section, we develop the example of a drink vending
machine, which we use to (1) further motivate the problem;
(2) highlight the difficulties of compositional testing within
the ioco-theory; and (3) provide an informal overview of our
proposed approach to tackle the problem.
The drink vending machine consists of the user interface
and the drink maker components. The user interface specifica-
tion S1 is shown in Fig. 2 (a). S1 requires that the user first
inserts a coin (coin?)1, and then selects either a tee (utee?) or a
coffee (ucoffee?). After choosing the coffee, the user can also
request milk (umilk?) for the coffee. The drink request (mtee!,
mcoffee! or mcoffeemilk!) is forwarded to the drink maker, and
the user interface waits for an acknowledgment (done?) that
the drink was delivered to the user. When the drink is ready, the
user interface emits a message (msg!) to the user and returns
to its initial state.
The drink maker specification S2, depicted in Fig. 2 (b),
waits for a drink request (mcoffee? or mcoffeemilk?) from the
user interface. Upon receiving the drink request, S2 signals
the delivery of the drink to the user (actions coffee! and
coffeemilk!) and finally an acknowledgment (done!) is sent
to the user interface. Note that S2 is under-specified in its
initial state A — it omits the action mtee? and thus makes an
assumption that the user interface never requests a tee.
We note that in states 1 and 2 of S1, and state A of S2 only
inputs are allowed. In the ioco-testing theory, such states are
called quiescent, where the quiescence denotes the absence
of observable outputs and internal actions. The absence of
outputs is considered to be observable, and is marked as a
special δ action (green self-loops in Fig. 2). Since quiescence
is usually not explicitly modeled by the designer, we omit
marking quiescent transitions in the rest of the section.
Specifications S1 and S2 give a certain freedom in im-
plementing user interface and drink machine components. In
particular, implementations can choose how to treat under-
specified (unexpected) inputs. For instance, S1 assumes that
the user inserts a coin before choosing the drink. If the
user swaps the order of actions, and first orders a drink,
S1 allows the implementation to react to this input in an
arbitrary way. Fig. 3 depicts possible implementations I1 and
I2 of their respective specifications S1 and S2. The user
interface implementation I1 closely follows its specification
1We consistently use the symbol ? to denote an input, and the symbol ! to
denote an output action.
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Fig. 2. Vending machine — specification of components: (a) user interface
S1; and (b) drink maker S2.
and silently ignores all unexpected inputs (marked in blue).
For example, if the user requests a coffee before inserting a
coin (in state 1), this request is silently consumed by I1. This
implementation is ioco-conformant to its specification because
it never generates an output which is not foreseen by S1.
Similarly to I1, the drink maker implementation I2 also silently
consumes unexpected inputs in all states, except in the state A.
In the initial state, I2 reacts to a tee request (mtee?) by moving
to the state B, from which a coffee (coffee!) is delivered to
the user. Although preparing a coffee upon a tee request may
not be a logical behavior, it is ioco-conformant to S2 — the
specification does not impose any particular reaction to the tee
request in its initial state, giving to correct implementations
complete freedom of handling such input.
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Fig. 3. Vending machine — implementation of components: (a) user interface
S1; and (b) drink maker S2. To improve readability of the figure, we omit the
missing input labels on blue self-loops. For instance, state 1 of S1 is labeled
with input actions utee?, ucoffee?, umilk? and done?, while states B, C and
D of S2 are labeled with mtee?, mcoffee? and mcoffeemilk?.
In the classic ioco-theory [3], specifications are combined
with the parallel composition operation for input/output transi-
tions systems [7]. Informally, parallel composition of two spec-
ifications is their Cartesian product, where each specification is
allowed to take local actions independently, but the two speci-
fications must synchronize on shared actions. Fig. 4 (a) depicts
the parallel composition of S1 and S2, where mtee, mcoffee,
mcoffeemilk and done are the shared actions. In addition to
parallel composition, we may wish to hide shared actions,
which are often only used to synchronize components, but are
not observable by the external user. In the vending machine
example, the user can observe inputs to the vending machine
(inserting a coin and choosing the drink) and the outputs
from the machine (the actual drink and the acknowledgment
message). The actions mtee, mcoffee, mcoffeemilk and done are
used for proper synchronization between the user interface and
the drink maker components and are not visible to the user.
Fig. 4 (b) depicts the parallel composition of specifications
S1 and S2 in which the shared actions are hidden (denoted
by the special action τ ). Fig. 5 (a) and (b) show the parallel
composition of the component implementations without and
with hiding of the synchronization actions, respectively.
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Fig. 4. Vending machine — specification: (a) parallel composition of S1 and
S2; (b) with shared actions mtee, mcoffee, mcoffeemilk and done hidden.
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Fig. 5. Vending machine — implementation: (a) parallel composition of I1
and I2; (b) with shared actions mtee, mcoffee, mcoffeemilk and done hidden.
While I1 is ioco-conformant to S1 and I2 is ioco-
conformant to S2, the composition of I1 and I2 is not ioco-
conformant to the composition of S1 and S2 (with or without
hiding of shared actions), as shown in [3]. We now explain
the reasons for non-compositionality of ioco in the vending
machine example.
Assuming that shared actions are not hidden, consider a test
case starting with the input sequence coin? · utee?. According
to the specification (Fig. 4 (a)), the only allowed observation
after reading this sequence is quiescence, since state 3A does
not have any outgoing transitions labeled by an output action.
However, the composed implementation (Fig. 5 (a)) emits
mtee!, an output action not allowed by the specification after
reading the same sequence. It follows that ioco-conformance
is not preserved by parallel composition.
Parallel composition is an operation tailored to combining
receptive components — whenever a component outputs a
shared action the other component is by definition able to
consume it from any of its local states. This is not the case for
non-receptive models. Indeed, S1 emits the shared action mtee!
in its local state 3, while the drink maker specification S2 is
not ready to consume it in its local state A, i.e. the assumption
of S2 is not fulfilled by S1. This results in a “deadlock” state
3A in the parallel composition of S1 and S2. However, the
intended meaning of under-specifying the action mtee? in the
state A of S2 is that S2 is free to choose any reaction to this
unexpected action. This is in contrast to what happens in state
3A of the composed specification.
We now consider the case when the shared actions are
hidden. After reading the input sequence coin? · ucoffee?, the
state of the composed system after hiding is not uniquely
defined — it can be either 4A or 6B (Fig. 5 (b)) since the
user cannot observe whether the hidden action mcoffee! has
taken place. Note that the specification (Fig. 4 (b)) leaves the
input umilk? unspecified in 6B, but not in 4A, thus resulting
in an ambiguity on what an external observer can expect as the
reaction to this input. In fact, according to the ioco-theory, the
only allowed observable output after executing the sequence
coin? · ucoffee? · umilk? is coffeemilk!, while the composed
implementation can output both coffeemilk! (if in state 6C) or
coffee! (if in state 6B).
umilk?
umilk?
mcoffeemilk! τ
τ
mtee?
mtee?
mcoffee?
mcoffeemilk?
mtee?
mcoffee?
mcoffeemilk?
mtee?
mcoffee?
mcoffeemilk?
coffeemilk!
coffee!
done!
mcoffee?
ucoffee?
utee?
coin?
done?
utee?
ucoffee?
coin?
umilk?
coin?
ucoffee?
done?
umilk?
τ
τ
umilk?
utee?
utee?
done?
coin?
utee?
done?
ucoffee?
coin?
ucoffee?
mtee!
msg!
mcoffee!
mcoffeemilk!
mcoffee!
DC
5
· · ·
· · ·
A
D1
D2
D3 B
DB
6
(a) (b)
· · ·
· · ·
DA
4
Fig. 6. Parts of the demonically completed specifications: (a) S1; and (b)
S2. States and transitions resulting from the completion are marked in red.
In [3], the authors propose two solutions to the above
anomalies. Both solutions guarantee that ioco-conformance is
preserved by parallel composition and hiding. The first solution
requires specification models to be receptive. We claim that
this restriction is too strong — under-specification of inputs is
one of the most powerful modeling tools for specifying open
systems. A component is almost always expected to work cor-
rectly only in constrained contexts, and under-specification of
inputs allows to exactly define a valid operating environment.
The second solution allows non-receptive models, but requires
their demonic completion — an operation that makes the
model effectively input-enabled. Demonic completion results
in adding transitions labeled with the under-specified inputs
from every state to a newly inserted “sink” portion of the
graph. The sink portion essentially self-loops with all inputs
and outputs. Demonic completion makes the intended meaning
of input under-specification explicit: when a system receives an
unexpected input, it has the full freedom to choose its reaction
to this input. Fig. 6 depicts parts of the demonically completed
specifications S1 and S2.
While demonic completion preserves the intended meaning
of specifications, we argue that it does not provide a fully
satisfactory solution to compositional ioco-testing. First, the
resulting specification after demonic completion increases in
size. Although linear, this increase is still important for exten-
sively under-specified models. For instance, S1 has 7 states
and 9 transitions, while its size increases to 10 states and
55 transitions after completion. Second, demonic completion
obfuscates the distinction between foreseen and unspecified
interactions between components. In Fig. 6 (a) the information
that the input action ucoffee? is not expected in state 6 is lost.
This lack of distinction between foreseen and unexpected
interactions between components masks the fact that we of-
ten deal with component specifications of poor quality. This
results in a composition which does not faithfully represent
the intended behavior of the overall system. In particular,
composition with hiding of demonically completed specifi-
cations may result in many vacuous behaviors. We illustrate
this problem with the example from Fig. 6. After composing
demonically completed variants of S1 and S2, and hiding the
synchronization action mcoffee, the external observer cannot
distinguish between states 4A and 6B, which in contrast to
the original composition (see Fig. 4 (b)), now both admit the
input action umilk?. However, umilk? triggers a transition from
6B to the state D1B, from which the demonically completed
specification S1 allows all possible behaviors, including the
one in which the acknowledgment message is sent back to the
user without any drink being served.
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Fig. 7. Vending machine — overall specification: (a) friendly composition of
S1 and S2; (b) with friendly hiding of synchronization actions mtee, mcoffee,
mcoffeemilk and done.
We propose an alternative approach to composition and
hiding that provides additional information to the designer. It
is inspired by interface theories [4], [5]. We provide a new
composition operation, called the friendly composition, which
takes an optimistic approach to combining two specifications.
Following the optimistic approach, two specifications are com-
patible for composition, if there exists some context in which
they can interact while both satisfying their guarantees. We
have seen in Fig. 4 (a) that the interaction of two specifications
(user interface and drink maker) results in states in which
one component is allowed to emit an output which is not
expected by the other component (action mtee! in the state
3A). We declare such states as ambiguous states, and compute
the maximal compound environment which avoids such states.
The algorithm that computes the friendly composition of two
specifications prunes all states from which the environment
cannot prevent the composed system from reaching an am-
biguous state. The resulting composite specification combines
the compatible interactions of two component specifications.
Fig. 7 (a) depicts the friendly composition of S1 and S2, where
red dashed transitions and states are the ones pruned away from
their parallel composition.
Similarly to friendly composition, we define the friendly
hiding operation, which prunes away from the specification
with hidden actions all the states that can become ambiguous
when interacting with an external environment. The resulting
specification is depicted in Fig. 7 (b), where red dashed
transition and states are pruned away from the composite
specification of S1 and S2 after hiding.
The main technical contribution of this paper is the defini-
tion of the friendly composition and friendly hiding operations,
for which we show that they preserve ioco-conformance.
In contrast to combining demonic completion with parallel
composition and hiding, our approach results in composite
specifications of smaller size. The resulting composite spec-
ification defines behaviors for which no integration testing
is needed. Apart from the technical contribution, we argue
that friendly composition and hiding expose weaknesses of
component specifications to the designer. The pruned behaviors
after applying friendly composition and hiding indicate that
assumptions made by individual component specifications may
be too weak and deserve more careful analysis. We claim that
the time spent on improving the quality of the component spec-
ifications so that they allow compositional testing is rewarded
with the avoidance of integration tests. We distinguish between
the following scenarios in using our approach to derive better
compositional specifications.
Scenario A: the designer can guarantee that the composed
system will be used in the context defined by the assumptions
of the friendly-composed specification and that the ambiguous
interactions will never take place. In this case, no additional
integration testing is needed. In the vending machine example,
this would mean that the designer has the possibility of
disabling the tee and milk request buttons.
Scenario B: by hiding shared actions information about the
internal state of the SUT may be lost, resulting in ambiguous
states. Better observability can be achieved by keeping some
shared actions visible to the external environment. From the
technical point of view, keeping the mcoffee! action visible
in the vending machine specification allows for compositional
testing.
Scenario C: the designer cannot guarantee that the composed
system will be used in the context defined by the friendly-
composed specification assumptions. In this case, the specifi-
cation is too weak and needs a revision. In our example, the
race between the input action umilk? and the output action
mcoffee! in S1 indicates a poor specification. We propose a
different specification, which requires an additional action and
in which the user is expected to make all requests before the
machine is able to process them.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we define labeled transition systems, par-
allel composition and hiding operations, input/output con-
formance relation (ioco), and recall the previous results on
compositional properties of ioco.
A. Labeled Transition Systems
An input/output labeled transition system (IOLTS) is a
formal model for specifying reactive systems. An IOLTS A
is a tuple (Q,LI , LO, T, qˆ), where Q is a countable set of
states, LI and LO are disjoint countable sets of input and
output labels, qˆ ∈ Q is the initial state and T is the transition
relation. We denote by L = LI ∪LO the set of all labels of an
IOLTS. To avoid ambiguity we may use subscripts, like QA, to
indicate that an element belongs to an IOLTS A. We consider
IOLTS with possibly silent transitions, denoted by τ , hence the
transition relation is defined as T ⊆ Q× (L∪ {τ})×Q, with
τ 6∈ L. An IOLTS is said to be receptive, denoted by R-IOLTS,
if for all q ∈ Q and for all a ∈ LI , there exists an outgoing
transition from q labeled by a. For instance, specifications S1
and S2 in Fig. 2 are IOLTS, while implementations I1 and
I2 in Fig. 3 are R-IOLTS. Strongly-convergent IOLTS are
transition systems that do not have loops consisting of only
silent transitions. We use the standard abbreviated notation,
where µ ∈ L ∪ {τ} and a ∈ L
q
µ−→ q′ ≡ (q, µ, q′) ∈ T
q
µ1·...·µn−−−−−→ q′ ≡ ∃q0, . . . , qn st. q = q0 µ1−→ q1
µ2−→ . . . µn−−→ qn = q′
q
µ1·...·µn−−−−−→ ≡ ∃q′ st. q µ1·...·µn−−−−−→ q′
q 6 µ1·...·µn−−−−−→ ≡ ¬∃q′ st. q µ1·...·µn−−−−−→ q′
q

=⇒ q′ ≡ q = q′ or q τ ·...·τ−−−−→ q′
q
a
=⇒ q′ ≡ ∃q1, q2 st. q =⇒ q1 a−→ q2 =⇒ q′
q
a1·...·an=====⇒ q′ ≡ ∃q0, . . . , qn st. q = q0 a1=⇒ q1
a2=⇒ . . . an=⇒ qn = q′
q
a1·...·an=====⇒ ≡ ∃q′ st. q a1·...·an=====⇒ q′
q 6 a1·...·an=====⇒ ≡ ¬∃q′ st. q a1·...·an=====⇒ q′
A sequence σ ∈ (L ∪ {τ})+ is an execution of an IOLTS
A if qˆA
σ−→. A sequence σ ∈ L∗ is a trace of A if qˆA σ=⇒. We
denote by Traces(A) the set of all traces of A. The sequence
coin · ucoffee · τ · coffee is an execution of the specification
shown in Fig. 4 (b), while coin · ucoffee · coffee is its trace.
Given a subset of labels L′ ⊆ L and σ a sequence over L, we
denote by σ↓L′ the projection σ to the set of labels L′.
We say that a state q ∈ Q of A is quiescent, denoted by
δ(q), if it has no outgoing output or internal actions. Quiescent
states emit a special quiescence action δ, which indicates
that A cannot proceed without input from the environment.
The suspension automata are IOLTS, where quiescent ac-
tions are made explicit. Formally, given an IOLTS A =
(Q,LI , LO, T, qˆ), its suspension automaton Aδ is the IOLTS
Aδ = (Q,L
I , LO∪{δ}, T∪Tδ, qˆ), where Tδ = {q δ−→ q | δ(q)}.
We denote by Straces(A) the set {σ ∈ (L ∪ {δ})∗ | qˆ σ=⇒Aδ}
of traces of Aδ , also called suspension traces. Specifications
S1 and S2 shown in Fig. 2 show explicitly quiescence actions,
where for example δ · coin · δ is in Straces(S1).
B. Parallel Composition
Two components can be integrated if their input/output
actions do not conflict. In particular, we require that the
intersection of their input (output) label sets is empty. For-
mally, we say that two IOLTS A1 and A2 are composable
if LI1 ∩ LI2 = LO1 ∩ LO2 = ∅. When two composable IOLTS
are composed, they synchronize on shared actions and move
independently on other actions. Formally, parallel composition
is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Parallel composition): Let A1 =
(Q1, L
I
1, L
O
1 , T1, qˆ1) and A2 = (Q2, L
I
2, L
O
2 , T2, qˆ2) be
two composable IOLTS. Their parallel composition, denoted
by A1 ‖ A2, is the IOLTS (Q1‖2, LI1‖2, LO1‖2, T1‖2, qˆ1‖2),
where Q1‖2 = Q1 × Q2, LI1‖2 = (LI1\LO2 ) ∪ (LI2\LO1 ),
LO1‖2 = L
O
1 ∪ LO2 , qˆ1‖2 = (qˆ1, qˆ2), and T1‖2 is defined by the
rules:
q1
µ−→A1 q′1 µ ∈ (L1 ∪ {τ})\L2
(q1, q2)
µ−→A1‖2 (q′1, q2)
q2
µ−→A2 q′2 µ ∈ (L2 ∪ {τ})\L1
(q1, q2)
µ−→A1‖2 (q1, q′2)
q1
µ−→A1 q′1 q2 µ−→A2 q′2 µ ∈ L1 ∩ L2
(q1, q2)
µ−→A1‖2 (q′1, q′2)
The specification S1 ‖ S2 shown in Fig. 4 (a) represents the
parallel composition of specifications S1 and S2.
C. Hiding
The parallel composition of two components is often
followed by hiding some of the actions on which they syn-
chronize. We follow the process algebraic approach in which
parallel composition and hiding operations are two separate
operations, and formally define hiding as follows.
Definition 2 (Hiding): Let A = (Q,LI , LO, T, qˆ) be an
IOLTS and Σ ⊆ LO be the subset of output actions. The
hiding of Σ in A, denoted by hΣ(A), is the tuple (Q,LI , LO \
Σ, hΣ(T ), qˆ), where hΣ(T ) is obtained from T by replacing
every transition (q, a, q′) ∈ T labeled by an output action
a ∈ Σ by the transition (q, τ, q′).
The specification hΣ(S1 ‖ S2) shown in Fig. 4 (b)
represents the hiding of Σ in S1 ‖ S2, where Σ =
{mtee,mcoffee,mcoffeemilk, done}.
D. Input/Output Conformance Relation
Given an IOLTS A, the set out(q) ≡ {a ∈ LO | q a−→ }∪
{δ | δ(q)} is the set of all outputs (including δ if q is
quiescent) that are defined when the system is in state q. The
set q after σ ≡ {q′ | q σ=⇒Aδ q′} denotes the set of states that
can be reached in A from q after reading σ in its suspension
automaton Aδ . We now present the formal definition of the
ioco relation.
Definition 3: Given a R-IOLTS I and an IOLTS S, we say
that I ioco S iff
∀σ ∈ Straces(S), out(qˆI after σ) ⊆ out(qˆS after σ).
In the vending machine example, both I1 ioco S1 and
I2 ioco S2, where S1 and S2 are depicted in Fig. 2 (a)
and (b), and I1 and I2 are depicted in Fig. 3 (a) and (b),
respectively. We now recall the results from [3] which state that
ioco is not preserved in general under parallel composition and
hiding, but is preserved if all the specifications are receptive.
Receptiveness of specifications can be achieved by demonic
completion (see [3] for its formal definition).
Theorem 1 ([3]): Given two composable R-IOLTS I1 and
I2, two composable IOLTS S1 and S2 and two composable
R-IOLTS S∗1 and S
∗
2 , we have
I1 ioco S1 ∧ I2 ioco S2 6→ (I1 ‖ I2) ioco (S1 ‖ S2)
I1 ioco S∗1 ∧ I2 ioco S∗2 → (I1 ‖ I2) ioco (S∗1 ‖ S∗2 ).
Theorem 2 ([3]): Given a R-IOLTS I , an IOLTS S and
a R-IOLTS S∗, defined over the alphabet L, and a subset
Σ ⊆ LO, we have
I ioco S 6→ hΣ(I) ioco hΣ(S)
I ioco S∗ → hΣ(I) ioco hΣ(S∗).
Consider the vending machine example, in which
I1 ioco S1 and I2 ioco S2, the sequence σ = coin · utee
and the compositions of specifications and implementations
before and after hiding (see Fig. 4 and 5). The available output
after executing σ on I1 ‖ I2 is mcoffee, while the composed
specification S1 ‖ S2 allows only δ after executing the same
sequence, hence I1 ‖ I2 does not ioco-conform to S1 ‖ S2. Af-
ter hiding the actions Σ = {mtee,mcoffee,mcoffeemilk, done}
in the composition, we obtain additional traces which are not
ioco-conformant. For instance, after executing the sequence
coin · ucoffee · umilk in hΣ(I1 ‖ I2), the possible outputs are
coffee and coffeemilk, while the specification hΣ(S1 ‖ S2)
allows only the action coffeemilk after executing the same
sequence.
We note that demonic completion introduces new “chaotic”
states to the original specification, from which all behaviors are
allowed. Exploring chaotic states in test case generation is not
useful. In order to avoid their exploration [3] defines the set
of Utraces. Intuitively, Utraces restricts Straces by eliminat-
ing underspecified traces. We obtain the uioco conformance
relation by replacing Straces with Utraces in the definition
of ioco. However, it turns out that uioco does not preserve
compositional properties (see [6] for details).
IV. OPTIMISTIC APPROACH TO COMPOSITION AND
HIDING
In this section, we formalize the friendly composition and
hiding operations, presented informally in Section II.
A. Friendly Environments
We have seen in Section III that parallel composition and
hiding can introduce ambiguous states, and that ioco is not
preserved under these two operations. An ambiguous state
results from the parallel composition of two IOLTS in which
one emits an action that the other one is not ready to accept.
Definition 4 (Ambiguous state): Given two composable
IOLTS A and B, a pair (qA, qB) ∈ QA×QB is an ambiguous
state if there exists a shared action α ∈ LA ∩ LB such that
either: (1) α ∈ LOA , qA α−→ and qB 6 α−→ ; or (2) α ∈ LOB , qB α−→
and qA 6 α−→ .
In the parallel composition S1 ‖ S2 of the vending machine
example, depicted in Fig. 4 (a), the state 3A is ambiguous
because S1 emits the output action mtee!, while S2 does not
accept it.
Inspired by contract-based design and interface theories,
we propose an optimistic approach to composition and hiding.
In this optimistic setting, we look for a friendly environment
which steers the specification away from ambiguous states. A
friendly environment is helpful towards the systems, by always
accepting the system’s outputs and never providing actions that
the system cannot accept as inputs.
Definition 5 (Friendly environment): Given an IOLTS
A = (Q,LI , LO, T, qˆ), a friendly environment for A is a
strongly-convergent IOLTS E = (QE , LO, LI , TE , qˆE) such
that A ‖ E does not have ambiguous states.
A composition-friendly environment does not allow a com-
posed system to reach an ambiguous state in the composition.
Definition 6 (Composition-friendly environment): Given a
composed IOLTS A ‖ B, a composition-friendly environment
for A ‖ B is its friendly environment such that for all ambigu-
ous states (qA, qB) ∈ QA‖B , for all qE ∈ E, ((qA, qB), qE) is
not reachable in (A ‖ B) ‖ E.
A friendly environment is maximal if it admits more
behaviors than any other friendly environment. The maximal
friendly environment is used to compute the largest portion of
the specification that is guaranteed to preserve conformance
under composition and hiding. The resulting specification
characterizes all sequences for which integration testing is not
necessary.
Definition 7 (Maximal friendly environment): A friendly
environment E for an IOLTS A is said to be maximal if
for all friendly environments E′ for A it holds Traces(E′) ⊆
Traces(E).
The IOLTS fragment that interacts correctly with its
friendly environment E is called its E-reachable fragment. It
is obtained by composing the IOLTS with E, while keeping
the original meaning of inputs and outputs.
Definition 8 (Environment reachable fragment): Let A be
an IOLTS and E be its friendly environment. The E-reachable
fragment of A is an IOLTS (Q,LI , LO, T, qˆ), where Q =
QA‖E , qˆ = qˆA‖E , LI = LIA, L
O = LOA , and T = TA‖E .
B. Friendly Composition, Friendly Hiding and ioco
We are now ready to formally define friendly composition
and hiding, and show that ioco is a pre-congruence for these
two operations. We use the maximal friendly environment to
restrict the classical parallel composition and hiding operations
to a fragment that guarantees avoiding ambiguous states.
Definition 9 (Friendly composition): Given two compos-
able IOLTS A and B, we say that they are compatible if there
exists a composition-friendly environment E for A ‖ B. Given
two compatible IOLTS A and B, their friendly composition,
denoted by A ⊗ B, is an E-reachable fragment of A ‖ B,
where E is the maximal composition-friendly environment for
A ‖ B.
Lemma 1: For any two compatible IOLTS A and B, there
exists a maximal composition-friendly environment for A ‖ B.
Definition 10 (Friendly hiding): Given an IOLTS A and
Σ ⊆ LO, the friendly Σ-hiding of A, denoted by hˆΣ(A), is
an E-reachable fragment of hΣ(A), where E is the maximal
friendly environment for hΣ(A).
The specifications S1 ⊗ S2 and hˆΣ(S1 ⊗ S2) depicted in
Fig. 7 (a) and (b) represent friendly composition of S1 and S2,
followed by the friendly hiding of the synchronization actions
Σ = {mtee,mcoffee,mcoffeemilk, done}.
We note that for receptive models, the friendly composition
and friendly hiding coincide with the parallel composition and
hiding. We state the main technical contributions of the paper
— that ioco relation is preserved under friendly composition
and friendly hiding.
Theorem 3: Given two compatible R-IOLTS I1 and I2 and
two compatible IOLTS S1 and S2, we have
I1 ioco S1 ∧ I2 ioco S2 → (I1 ⊗ I2) ioco (S1 ⊗ S2).
Theorem 4: Given a R-IOLTS I and an IOLTS S defined
over the set LO of output labels and Σ ⊆ LO, we have
I ioco S → hˆΣ(I) ioco hˆΣ(S).
Corollary 1: Given two compatible R-IOLTS I1 and I2,
two compatible IOLTS S1 and S2, and Σ ⊆ LO1‖2, we have
I1 ioco S1 ∧ I2 ioco S2 → hˆΣ(I1 ⊗ I2) ioco hˆΣ(S1 ⊗ S2).
C. Computing Friendly Composition and Hiding
In this section, we present the algorithms for effectively
computing the friendly composition and hiding. We first create
the deterministic maximal friendly environment E for an
IOLTS A. It is constructed by swapping input and output labels
of A and applying a variant of the subset construction that
determinizes the IOLTS afterwards.
Our variant of the subset construction works as follows.
Consider an IOLTS A, the standard subset construction C of A,
and a state S of C. When C is in S, the maximal environment
must accept all output transitions from S. In contrast, the
environment provides an input to C only if all states in S
can accept it. As we can see, E quantifies existentially over
outputs in A and universally over inputs in A.
Definition 11 (Maximal deterministic friendly environment):
The maximal deterministic friendly environment of
an IOLTS A = (Q,LI , LO, T, qˆ) is an IOLTS
Emax(A) = (2
Q, LO, LI , TE , Qˆ), where Qˆ = qˆ after ,
and (S, α, S′) ∈ TE if: 1) S′ = S after α; 2) α ∈ LI implies
that q α−→ for all q ∈ S; and 3) α ∈ LO implies that there
exists q ∈ S such that q α−→.
Algorithm 1 Friendly composition
Input: composable IOLTS A1 and A2
Output: A1 ⊗A2 or not compatible
E ← Emax(A1 ‖ A2)
Amb← states in E that contain an ambiguous s. of A1 ‖ A2
Prune← ∅
for all S ∈ Amb do
Prune ← Prune ∪ {state S′ in E | ∃σ ∈ LOA1‖A2
∗
:
S′ σ=⇒E S}
remove states in Prune from E
if E has no initial state then return not compatible
else return E-reachable fragment of (A1 ‖ A2)
Algorithm 1 constructs the friendly composition for IOLTS
A1 and A2 or returns the information that they are not com-
patible. First, it constructs the maximal deterministic friendly
environment Emax(A1 ‖ A2). The algorithm then computes
the set Amb of states in Emax(A1 ‖ A2) that contain an
ambiguous state from A1 ‖ A2 and prunes away all states
in Emax(A1 ‖ A2) that reach Amb by a trace of output labels
in A1 ‖ A2. If the initial state is removed in the process, then
no friendly environment for A1 ‖ A2 exists. Otherwise, E
is the resulting maximal composition-friendly environment for
A1 ‖ A2 and the E-reachable fragment of A1 ‖ A2 is their
friendly composition. The friendly composition A1⊗A2 con-
structed by the algorithm is of size at most |A1|·|A2|·2|A1|·|A2|
and if A1 and A2 are both deterministic, then A1 ⊗ A2 is of
size |A1| · |A2|.
Algorithm 2 computes the friendly Σ-hiding of an IOLTS
A, where Σ ⊆ LOA . To obtain the maximal deterministic
friendly environment, we simply hide actions in A, determinize
it and then construct its maximal friendly environment E. The
friendly hiding hˆΣ(A) computed by the algorithm is of size
2|A| and if A is deterministic, then hˆΣ(A) is of size |A|. We
note that there always exists a friendly environment E for
arbitrary A. It suffices that E accepts all outputs from A and
does not provide any inputs.
Algorithm 2 Friendly hiding
Input: IOLTS A, Σ ⊆ LOA ,
Output: hˆΣ(A)
E ← Emax(hΣ(A))
return E-reachable fragment of hΣ(A)
V. EVALUATION
To evaluate our approach to compositional testing in
the ioco-theory, we implemented a proof-of-concept tool for
computing friendly composition and hiding. We applied the
tool to the alternating bit protocol taken from the CADP
examples repository [8]. We were interested in the quality
of the component specifications with respect to compositional
testing. We also compared the size of the friendly composition
of the component specifications to the size of the specification
obtained by the demonic completion approach.
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Fig. 8. CADP specifications of the sender and receiver component for a
variant of the Alternating Bit-Protocol. The τ transitions model time-outs.
The alternating bit protocol is a data transfer protocol sup-
porting re-transmission of lost or corrupted messages. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume a perfect link (no corruption of
messages). The protocol consists of a sender A and a receiver
B. Initially, the sender A waits for data to be transmitted
(Put?). Upon receiving the data, it sends it to B together
with a sequence bit (Data0!) and waits for an acknowledgment
(Ack0?). If the acknowledgment does not arrive before a time-
out, A re-transmits the data. This behavior is modeled by a
τ -transition, which abstracts away the actual time-out value.
Once A receives the acknowledgment, it flips the sequence bit
and repeats the procedure (Data1! and Ack1?).
Receiver B behaves in a similar way. It first waits for data
marked with the sequence bit (Data0?) and possibly takes
a time-out transition. Upon receiving the data, it sends it to
the external environment (Put!) and, in a next step, sends an
acknowledgment marked with the same sequence bit to the
sender (Data0!). The receiver then repeats the procedure with
the flipped sequence bit.
Sender A and receiver B (cf. Fig. 8) are not compatible,
i.e. no friendly environment guarantees the correctness of the
protocol. There is a number of composition-ambiguous states
in the parallel composition of A and B, mainly due to the
time-out (τ ) transitions. For instance, A can be either in state
1 or 2 after reading the trace Put ·Data0. In state 2, A expects
the input Ack0? which is not the case in state 1, where A is
ready to re-transmit Data0! and is brought to after a time-out.
Similar problems occur with the receiver B due to its own
time-out transitions.
It follows that the specifications for A and B are too
weak for compositional testing. In order to strengthen the
specification of A, we need to improve the handling of the
race between re-transmitting data to B and receiving the ac-
knowledgment from B. We tackle the problem by making the
assumptions about the handling of an acknowledgment more
explicit and introduce additional states in the specification.
The similar time-out problem of receiver B is handled in a
slightly different way: time-out is no longer modeled as a
τ -transition but as a self-loop that allows B continuous re-
transmission of acknowledgments to A, while waiting for new
data. The strengthened specifications A′ and B′ of the sender
and receiver are depicted in Fig. 9 (a) and (b). Their friendly
composition (Fig. 9 (c)) contains no composition-ambiguous
state.
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Fig. 9. Strengthened specifications (a) A′; (b) B′; and (c) their friendly
composition.
A′ ⊗ B′ introduces new ambiguous states. A friendly envi-
ronment cannot observe the internal state of A′ ⊗ B′ and
decide when the protocol is ready to receive new data items
(Put? action). The easy way to overcome this problem is to
add constraints to the original specification of the sender that
say how to handle the input Put? when the sender is in a
non-observable state. The solution we use in this example,
however, is to strengthen the sender specification by adding
an output action Ready! which tells the external environment
that it is ready to accept new data. The resulting specification
A′′ is depicted in Fig. 10 (a). The new specification requires
a hand-shake between the protocol and the environment and
results in the friendly composition hˆΣ(A′′ ⊗ B′) followed
by the friendly hiding of Σ = {Ack0,Ack1,Data0,Data1}.
The composite specification hˆΣ(A′′ ⊗B′) does not encounter
any ambiguous states. It follows that any implementation of
sender A′′ and receiver B′ can be tested individually and that
their composition is correct-by-construction, without need for
additional integration tests.
We finally compare the size of hˆΣ(A′′⊗B′) to the one of
hΣ(d(A) ‖ d(B)), where d(A) and d(B) denote the demon-
ically completed variants of A and B. The results are shown
in Table I. We first observe that by applying our approach
we obtain specifications of smaller size than by demonically
completing the component specifications and then applying
parallel composition and hiding. This is in particular visible
when comparing the size of hΣ(d(A) ‖ d(B)) (76 transitions
and 34 states), to the one of hˆΣ(A′′⊗B′) (24 transitions and 12
states). We note that in our approach, only foreseen interactions
between components are taken into account, which is not
the case with the demonic completion approach. While our
framework may require manual improvement of the component
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Fig. 10. Strengthened specifications (a) A′′; (b) B′; and (c) their friendly
composition followed by friendly hiding of Σ.
Model # tran # states
A 10 6
B 10 6
d(A) 31 9
d(B) 28 9
A′′ 22 10
B′ 14 6
hΣ(d(A) ‖ d(B)) 76 34
hˆΣ(A
′′ ⊗ B′) 24 12
TABLE I. SIZES OF SPECIFICATION MODELS AND THEIR
COMPOSITIONS.
specifications, we argue that this is the right procedure to arrive
at specifications of good quality for compositional testing.
Although more automated, the demonic completion approach
to compositional testing admits many useless implementations.
To summarize, the case study shows that the alternating
bit protocol specification was not modeled with compositional
testing in mind. Parts of the sender and receiver specifications
are not sufficiently specified for cooperative interactions and
do not admit compositional testing with ioco. We improved
the specifications by strengthening the assumptions where
needed. We note that despite the strengthening, the improved
specifications are not input-enabled.
We finally remark that although the individual component
specifications are strongly convergent, their composition with
hiding is not. This may be a problem for testing with qui-
escence in general (see [2]) but does not affect our work as
presented here: we only require friendly environments to be
strongly-convergent.
VI. RELATED WORK
This paper is inspired by [3] and extends it by defining
new composition and hiding operations adapted for under-
specified models and preserving compositional properties of
ioco. Compositional properties of the real-time conformance
relation tioco were studied in [9]. In order to preserve com-
positional testing with tioco, specifications are required to be
receptive. Compositional properties of the cspio conformance
relation for model-based testing with CSP specifications were
studied in [10]. CSP operations are shown to be monotonic
with respect to cspio when the specifications are input-enabled,
or the implementations are not receptive, and after each
trace, the input actions accepted by the implementation are a
subset of those offered by the specification. The compositional
testing problem for systems modeled as networks of abstract
components, based on coalgebraic definitions, was considered
in [11]. Once again, specifications must be receptive to pre-
serve compositional properties in testing. Assume-guarantee
reasoning is combined with ioco in [12] in order to allow
compositional testing. This work is complementary to ours,
as it starts from a global specification of the complete system,
and uses assumptions about components to divide and conquer
the testing process. A methodology to reduce the efforts of
integration testing is presented in [13]. It combines model-
based integration with model-based testing, but does not pro-
vide formal arguments that support the proposed approach.
This paper is also inspired by the interface theories [4],
[5]. In contrast to interface automata, used in the context
of contract-based design, this work focuses on compositional
properties in testing. Instead of iterative design through step-
wise refinement, the ioco-theory assumes the existence of an
implementation. We consider ioco with its explicit treatment
of quiescence as the refinement relation, rather than alternation
simulation used in interface automata. The integration of
specifications in the ioco-theory separates parallel composition
from hiding, thus allowing for multicast and broadcast com-
munication. In interface automata, parallel composition and
hiding are combined into a single operation, thus allowing
point-to-point communication only. We also mention similar
frameworks in contract-based design: synchronous interfaces
with and without shared variables [14], synchronous relational
interfaces [15], and real-time interfaces [16], [17].
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
We proposed a novel approach to compositional testing for
ioco based on friendly composition and hiding. Our framework
characterizes foreseen interactions between components and
minimizes the effort needed for integration testing. In addition
to the technical results, this paper gives new insights to
compositional testing in general and the associated difficulties.
In particular, we use our approach to provide guidelines
for identifying weaknesses in component specifications and
improving them with compositional testing in mind. Since
high-level specifications are typically much smaller than the
actual implementations, we argue that this additional effort
in model analysis is rewarded with a reduction of effort in
expensive integration testing.
In our framework, we assume that the composition of
component specifications is the specification of the integrated
system. In the future, we will study how to exploit our results
when the overall system is specified with a separate model.
In particular, we will investigate whether our results can be
combined with [12]. In addition, we will study whether we can
weaken the notion of the ambiguous states, while preserving
compositional properties of ioco. Although we considered
asynchronous models and ioco-theory, we are confident that
our results can be adapted to different modeling frameworks
and conformance relations. In fact, many issues related to
compositional testing come from the power of the IOLTS
model, where components compete in executing the actions
without much restrictions. We will adapt our work to the
synchronous data-flow systems, which we believe have more
robust properties with respect to composition and hiding.
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